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XX. Acts by which human society is not injured, directly or indirectly, are not punishable by men. The explanation thereofXXI. A refutation of the view that pardon is never permissibleXXII. Proof that pardon is permissible prior to the penal lawXXIII. But pardon is not permissible in all casesXXIV. Proof that pardon is permissible even after the establishment of the penal lawXXV. What intrinsic causes are sufficient to cause the suspension of the lawXXVI. What extrinsic causes are sufficientXXVII. Rejection of the view that there is no just cause to suspend the law, unless it is one that is contained in the law as an implied exceptionXXVIII. The measure of punishment according to what is deserved.
XXIX. A consideration, in this connection, of the causes which lead to, crime, and a comparison of these with one anotherXXX. Also a consideration of the causes that should have restrained from sin; with a discussion of the order of the commandments of the decalogue that apply to one's neighbor, and some other thingsXXXI. Also the inclination of the sinner toward incentives to and deterrents from sinning, which is considered from various points of viewXXXII. The desert of punishment may be extended to include a greater harm than the sinner has actually inflicted. The reasons therefore.
XXXIII. Rejection of the idea of a harmonic proportion in punishmentsXXXIV. Punishment may be mitigated on the ground of regard for others, unless a greater regard for others opposesXXXV. How the opportunity to commit sin may urge to its punishment also how the habit of sinning may urge to the punishment of the sin or dissuade from itXXXVI. The use of clemency in mitigating punishmentsXXXVII. What the Jews and the Romans thought should be taken into consideration in punishments is brought into relation with the foregoing discussionXXXVIII. On war waged to inflict punishmentXXXIX. By distinguishing various cases, it is explained whether a war waged to punish wrongs that have been merely attempted is justXL. A discussion whether kings and peoples may rightly wage war on account of things done contrary to the law of nature, although not against them or their subjects; with a refutation of the view that the law of nature requires right of jurisdiction for the exaction of punishment.
XLI. The law of nature must be distinguished from widely current national customsXLII. The law of nature must be distinguished also from the Divine law that is not voluntarily recognized by allXLIII. In the law of nature we must distinguish between what is evident and what is not evident. XLIV. Whether war may be waged on account of crimes against GodXLV. What ideas of God are most generally accepted; and how these are indicated in the first commandments of the DecalogueXLVI. Those who first do violence to these common ideas may be punishedXLVII. But we may not punish others in like manner, as is shown by an argument from the Hebraic lawXLVIII. Wars cannot justly be waged against those who are unwilling to accept the Christian religionXLIX. Wars are justly waged against those who treat Christians with cruelty for the sake of their religion aloneL. Wars may not be justly waged against those who err in the interpretation of the Divine law; as is proven by authorities and examplesLI. But war may justly be waged against those who show impiety toward the gods they believe in